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 I 
 
 In a series of publications,1 Ralph Johnson has maintained that any discourse worthy of 
being called an argument contains not just reasons given to support some claim——the illative 
core of the argument——but replies to objections and alternative positions——the dialectical 
tier. A written or spoken argument, presented in the form of a text, should be properly understood 
as a product of a dialectical procedure, where a proponent puts forward a thesis and answers 
questions posed by a challenger. Argumentation begins when the challenger questions a 
statement put forward by the proponent. Given his reply, the challenger may ask further 
questions, to which the proponent may reply, this procedure possibly continuing through a 
number of exchanges. The aim of the proponent is to meet these questions of the challenger and 
ultimately to persuade her of the acceptability of the claim she initially challenged. This is his 
goal unless, of course, her questions reveal an inadequacy in the defensibility of his claim——at 
least as he is currently able to carry out that defense. Such a process or procedure would be 
incomplete, if the proponent left various questions of the challenger unanswered. The proponent 
would not have met his dialectical obligations (Blair and Johnson 1987, 54). In (1987), Blair and 
Johnson likewise see an argument as product as incomplete if "it does not engage the common, 
known objections to its conclusion and to the premises of arguments supporting it" (Blair and 
Johnson 1987, 54-55). The proponent still has dialectical obligations, even if there is no 
embodied challenger. His obligation is to answer the questions presenting these common, known 
objections, which he foresees the challenger would ask. 
 In (1992), Johnson highlights how this conception of argumentation leads to a two-
leveled conception of argument. 
 
 Because we wish to persuade by reason, we recognize that the claim we are interested in 
must be supported by reasons. This first tier is then composed of the conclusion and the 
premises which support it. But one-tier is not enough. Rational agents recognize that 
other reasoners will have taken different positions, or will have a variety of objections to 
lodge against our position, and so we must provide a second tier——a dialectical tier——
in which this wider context is addressed (Johnson 1992, 155). 
 
The proponent puts forward his argument against a dialectical background of opposing points of 
view, maintained even in the light of the evidence he puts forward on the first tier. We may 
presume that members of the audience have heard at least some of these objections. To rationally 
persuade the audience, the proponent must address these objections. How well an arguer reasons 
concerning alternative positions and objections constitutes part of the evaluative criteria for 
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argumentation. 
 
 II 
 
 In (1999), Trudy Govier presents nine objections against Johnson's two-tiered conception 
of argument, regarding the last two as raising significant problems. The first of these claims that 
Johnson's position leads to an infinite regress. When, after presenting the initial argument 
constituting the illative core, one replies to an objection or addresses an alternative position, what 
is one doing but presenting a supplementary argument? Does this argument consist only of an 
illative core or does it, in turn, include a dialectical tier? But if an argument, then on Johnson's 
definition, it would seem to itself involve a dialectical tier. But what about the replies to 
objections and responses to alternative positions included in this dialectical tier? They would be 
supplementary arguments to the supplementary arguments. But what about the dialectical tier of 
these arguments? As is evident, we are caught in an infinite regress. "On this interpretation, the 
dialectical tier would not be a tier, it would be a staircase that mounts forever" (Govier 1999, 
233). 
 Govier's second objection concerns just how many objections and alternatives need to be 
considered on the dialectical tier. Do we have to consider all or only some? This should pose a 
dilemma for Johnson. Requiring considering all objections and alternative positions would seem 
to pose too stringent a burden on the proponent. "For many arguments and claims, there will be a 
great many of these [objections and alternatives], new ones being formulated all the time" 
(Govier 1999, 216). But if replies to only some objections and alternatives are needed, how do 
we discriminate between those which need a reply and those which do not? What grounds let us 
identify those requiring a reply? "Articulating such grounds will be no easy matter" (Govier 
1999, 218). 
 Govier entertains two approaches to avoiding the regress problem. The restrictive 
approach requires that only alternatives and objections to the main claim and the arguments given 
for it, objections against the illative core, are necessary. This would stop the regress, but "It 
seems arbitrary and ad hoc to demand that an arguer's initial argument must be supported by a 
dialectical tier, yet claim that the supplementary arguments need no such further support" (Govier 
1999, 215). "Though supplementary, a supplementary argument is nevertheless an argument" 
(Govier 1999, 234). The conclusion of a supplementary argument may be controversial and the 
argument open to objections. Exploring these issues may be necessary to developing an overall 
adequate case for the conclusion. 
 The other approach is the Benign Interpretation. Here we may ascend the dialectical 
staircase, replying to alternatives to the conclusions of arguments on the (first stair of) the 
dialectical tier and objections to these arguments, and ascending to further steps, when challenges 
are presented. Arguments are open to challenge. By responding and thus developing an argument, 
we get a stronger, better argument. But, according to the Benign Interpretation, one does not have 
to have responded to all challenges (and challenges to responses to challenges) ad infinitum——
the completed infinite regress——to give an argument. "According to the Benign Interpretation, 
the argument goes forward, and can go forward indefinitely. But that is not to say that it required 
an infinite ascent before it could be formulated at all" (Govier 1999, 235). 
 Govier, however, is not sanguine about the Benign Interpretation. It seems to abandon 
Johnson's position that to give an argument, one must include a dialectical tier. On the Benign 
Interpretation, as an argument exfoliates, the subarguments presenting replies to the most 
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recently pressed challenges will not have a dialectical tier. Govier returns to the question——
Must the supplementary arguments be dialectically adequate? To say no is to endorse the ad hoc 
restrictive account. To say yes is to be caught in a vicious infinite regress. Govier sees this 
problem as intractable. 
 Addressing the discrimination problem, Govier indicates that she favors requiring a 
proponent to respond to all alternatives to the conclusion. She believes that in general a 
proponent will be able to discharge this objection. Several alternative positions may share a 
common presupposition and thus may be grouped together. By arguing against the presupposition 
one addresses and argues against all the alternatives which presuppose it. Govier comments that 
in light of such grouping, 
 
 There seemed to be between four and eight alternative positions on several issues with 
which I was familiar and on which I did a preliminary analysis. If this result is at all 
representative, it seems tolerable to demand that an adequate dialectical tier require a 
response to all the alternative positions (Govier 1999, 228). 
 
Govier sees intractable problems in trying to discriminate those alternatives which need reply 
from those which do not. Two approaches, the epistemic——"stipulating that only intellectually 
credible alternatives require a response," (Govier 1999, 228) and the pragmatic approach, 
"stipulating that only the alternatives prominent in the audience require a response," (Govier 
1999, 228) are possible. Govier finds the epistemic approach flawed because she believes 
deeming an alternative intellectually credible is the subjective decision of the proponent. The 
pragmatic approach will be unfeasible if the audience is unknown and inadequate if the audience 
is slack in its standards of intellectual credibility. 
 Govier regards an objection as itself involving an argument——a premise/conclusion 
structure. "Implicitly, if not explicitly, one who raises an objection is either saying `O; therefore 
there is something wrong with the conclusion C' or `O; therefore there is something wrong with 
the argument put forward in support of C'" (Govier 1999, 229). She categorizes five types of 
objections, those raised against the conclusion, the argument supporting the conclusion, the 
arguer, the arguer's qualifications, personal characteristics, or circumstances, and the expression 
of the argument or conclusion (Govier 1999, 231). Furthermore 
 
 Within each category, we may distinguish between strong objections and mild objections. 
Strong objections allege that the defective feature indicates that the case is false, wrong, 
incorrect....Mild objections raise evidence suggesting the conclusion may be false or may 
need qualification, or the argument may be flawed (Govier 1999, 231). 
 
Hence, there are ten different categories of objections and for most arguments a myriad of 
objections distributed over these categories. We must face the discrimination problem for 
objections. If we say that those objections which would show the argument or conclusion false or 
unacceptable need only be addressed, we then need consider only strong objections. Furthermore, 
by putting forward a claim and arguing for it, the proponent has committed himself to the claim's 
being true or acceptable and the argument for it cogent (Govier 1999, 232).  Hence, strong 
objections against the claim or against the argument are especially crucial and all such objections 
should be addressed. Govier is willing to put this forward at least tentatively as a response to the 
discrimination problem. 
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 III 
 
 I believe that Govier's Benign Interpretation is closer to solving the regress problem than 
she gives it credit. I believe it also provides a framework for solving the discrimination problem. 
We must first ask whether Govier has represented Johnson's position accurately. In particular, 
when he says that arguments must contain a dialectical tier, replies to objections and alternatives, 
has he committed himself to saying that these replies must be arguments in their own right, able 
to stand on their own as separate arguments and thus themselves possessing dialectical tiers? In 
(1996), Johnson formulates two dialectical criteria this way: 
 
 (D1) How well does the argument address itself to alternative positions? 
 (D2) How well does the argument deal with objections? 
 
(Johnson 1996, 265, italics added) What does it mean for an argument to "address itself" or "deal 
with" a certain issue? Johnson is obviously speaking informally or intuitively here. But just 
because of that, we cannot with confidence impute to him the claim that he means that a 
dialectically adequate argument must contain subarguments——each with its own dialectical 
tier——in which these alternatives are refuted and objections rebutted. 
 Again, in (1996) Johnson puts his point this way: 
 
 We have seen that the practice of argumentation presupposes a background of 
controversy....Those who know anything about the issue are aware that there are still 
others who see things differently. They have objections to the arguer's premises....If the 
arguer wishes to persuade rationally, the arguer is obligated to take account of these 
objections, these opposing points of view....And so the process of argumentation must 
have a second tier in which objections and criticisms are dealt with(Johnson 1996, 106-
107, italics added). 
 
Again, in requiring the arguer to take account of, deal with objections and criticisms, Johnson is 
not in any obvious way saying that the arguer must produce arguments including in themselves a 
dialectical tier. In (2000a), Johnson uses the same words to characterize his view: 
 
 If the arguer wishes to persuade Others rationally, the arguer is obligated to take account 
of...objections and opposing points of view....Thus, the process of argumentation must 
include a second——dialectical——tier in which objections and criticisms are dealt with 
(Johnson 2000a, 160). 
 
He also speaks of an argument as possessing "a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his 
dialectical obligations" (Johnson 2000a, 168). Again, I see no evidence that Johnson is 
committed to the view that the only way one can discharge one's dialectical obligations is 
through producing an argument which itself has a dialectical tier. 
 Given what Johnson has said in characterizing both the illative core and the dialectical 
tier, we can seriously question whether this is his position. For in the illative core, the arguer 
gives reasons to support his claim which are open to criteria of logical assessment, e.g. 
acceptability, relevance and ground adequacy. In dealing then with an alternative position or an 
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objection, would it not be sufficient to bring reasons against that alternative position or rebutting 
those objections, all things being equal? Only if all things were not equal, if there were some 
straightforwardly recognized objection to counting the reasons given on the dialectical tier as 
good reasons, would there be a need to ascend to a further level. Hence we can question whether 
Govier's infinite regress problem is a genuine problem for Johnson's position or whether it is a 
problem for Govier's misreading of Johnson's position, where she has simply read into his view 
the claim that the reasoning presented at the dialectical tier must constitute an argument in its 
own right, with a dialectical tier of its own. 
 Apart from the proper exegesis of Johnson's texts, we may ask whether in some 
circumstances simply presenting reasons for some claim, without entertaining dialectical 
considerations, may properly support that claim, render it acceptable to the challenger, justifying 
her belief in that claim. This is a more basic question for assessing whether the dialectical tier 
involves us in an infinite regress. Let us ask an even more basic question. Must every statement 
put forward by a proponent to a challenger be justified by reasons, by premises explicitly given to 
support that claim or conclusion? The answer is clearly negative, for otherwise we would have an 
infinite regress.2 The proponent's argument will have basic premises. We hold that such basic 
premises will be acceptable for the challenger just in case given the current evidence of which 
she is aware, there is a presumption for such premises from her point of view. Stating the 
conditions under which there is such a presumption is beyond the scope of this paper.3
 Now consider this very simple case. Suppose our proponent seeks to rationally persuade 
the challenger of the truth of some claim C. Suppose he puts forward the following two premises: 
 P 
 When P obtains, other things being equal, C obtains also. 
Suppose there is a presumption for both of these premises from the challenger's point of view. 
For her, they are acceptable basic premises. Suppose the challenger is aware of conditions R1, ..., 
Rn, each logically possible, such that if any one of them obtained, other things would not be 
equal. But suppose from the challenger's point of view none of R1, ..., Rn are real possibilities. 
That is, suppose from her point of view that there is a presumption for ~R1,  ..., ~Rn, i.e. there is a 
presumption for saying that other things are equal. Then why from her point of view should there 
not be a presumption for C in light of the proponent's reasons taken together? Hence, if on the 
dialectical tier one were either refuting an alternative position or rebutting an objection, it is 
conceptually possible that a proponent could rationally dissuade a challenger of the alternative or 
objection by presenting reasons against it, where there would be no reason to ascend to some 
further dialectical tier. The illative core argumentation at the dialectical tier would be sufficient, 
at least in this case, to render discounting the alternative or objections acceptable for the 
challenger. 
 Of course, all things might not be equal. The challenger may have legitimate questions 
about whether some Ri obtains. In that case, the argumentation would need to be extended. But 
this is in line with the Benign Interpretation, which sees argumentation as indefinitely 
extendable. 
 
 IV 
 
 What may we say concerning the discrimination problem? What objections necessitate 
replies? Johnson has already indicated that in his view a proponent need not reply to all logically 
possible objections. "Clearly, the arguer cannot be expected to deal with all of the possible and-or 
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actual objections. So how does one specify which ones?" (Johnson 2000a, 166) In (1992) he 
speaks of the proponent's empirical dialectical situation. Competing alternative positions have 
been put forward along with various objections to his argument. (See Johnson 1992, 156.) The 
challenger will have heard of them and as proponent he needs to address them. In (1996) Johnson 
speaks of defusing well-known objections. (See 1996, 111.) 
 In (2000a), Johnson captures this in the notion of addressing The Standard Objections. 
Not only the proponent, but "anyone familiar with the issue will also know the variety of 
positions and will have heard the various objections and criticisms, some of which will have 
achieved greater salience than others" (Johnson 2000a, 332). The Standard Objections are 
precisely these salient objections. Johnson also feels that the proponent must address any 
additional objections he knows the audience expects to be dealt with or believes his position can 
handle (Johnson 2000a, 332). But he is not totally satisfied with this characterization, since it is 
tied too closely with audiences and their vicissitudes. 
 In (2000b), Johnson approaches the discrimination problem by distinguishing a 
proponent's dialectical obligations at the construction and revision stages of his argument. At the 
construction phase, the proponent is obligated to respond to the Standard Objections, together 
with any further objections——at least serious objections——he might anticipate, even if they 
are not generally recognized and thus not included in the Standard Objections. At the revision 
stage, he is obligated to respond to the objections actually brought against his argument as 
constructed. Should several challengers in effect present the same objection, the proponent need 
make only one reply. Further, Johnson allows that the proponent has a prima facie objection to 
respond just to the serious objections. This for Johnson means that first "the objection must itself 
take the form of an argument," (Johnson 2000b, 9) i.e. it must itself be supported by an argument. 
Secondly the objection "creates the appearance that the argument is false, wrong, or incorrect" 
(Johnson 2000b, 10). Further should the objections be directed against a premise of the 
argument, the premise must be crucial (Johnson 2000b, 10-11). This, Johnson opines, may cut 
the class of actually presented objections down to a manageable size for response. 
 Johnson sees his response to the discrimination problem raising a host of open questions, 
including just what is an objection and just what makes an objection strong or serious. What 
types of objections are there and how may we characterize those which are Standard? Likewise, 
how may we characterize dialectical obligations or dialectical adequacy? (Johnson 2000b, 15-16) 
I believe that Rescher's account of formal disputation in (1977) sheds light on a number of these 
questions, indeed providing us with at least a partial approach to the discrimination problem. 
 First, formal disputation distinguishes certain types of objections a challenger could bring 
forward. An exchange begins when the proponent categorically asserts some claim or thesis. 
 !C "C is the case." 
Only the proponent may make categorical assertions. To this move, the challenger may respond 
with either a cautious denial 
 †~C "~C is the case for all that you have shown." "Please show C." "Why C?" 
or with a provisoed denial 
 ~C/P and †P "Ceteris paribus, when P is the case, ~C is the case and P is the case for all 
that you have shown." 
Responding to a cautious denial initiates the development of the illative core of the argument. A 
provisoed denial clearly contains an objection (to the conclusion of the argument) and the 
response to it would take us to the dialectical tier. 
 We may consider both cautious and provisoed denials as objections to the categorically 
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asserted C. Notice that these objections are distinctly different from what Johnson and Govier 
might characterize as a strong objection. First, the challenger does not assert them, does not 
claim that ~C or that P, but simply raises the question of why these should not be the case. 
Hence, given the standard view that the burden of proof lies with the one making an assertion, it 
would seem that the challenger is under no obligation to defend ~C or P with argument or 
supporting reasons. Having given an argument for an objection, then, is not a necessary condition 
for that objection to merit response from the proponent. 
 Would a proponent always be obligated to reply to the challenger's cautious denial of his 
initial thesis? I believe that an interplay of dialectical and epistemic considerations enter here and 
in connection with the other objections a challenger might bring forward. Since the proponent is 
asserting C, he standardly has a prima facie dialectical obligation to defend C. This obligation 
could be defeated on various epistemic grounds. Suppose C is a matter of common knowledge or 
by asserting C, the proponent is giving personal testimony. Suppose there is no reason to 
question C as a matter of received wisdom or to question either the proponent's veracity in 
asserting C or his capacity to observe that to which he is testifying. In other words, let us suppose 
that there is an epistemic presumption in favor of C. Then unless the challenger herself can argue 
otherwise, her cautious denial would be trivial or quibbling and the proponent not under an 
obligation to respond. 
 Turning to provisoed denials, Rescher makes the simplifying assumption that the 
statements of the form X/Y which challenger and also proponent put forward in the course of a 
disputation are always correct. Obviously in a complete account of which objections a proponent 
must meet, this assumption would be given up. But we retain it for the sake of our discussion 
here. Hence, the proponent cannot respond by asserting 
 !~(~C/P) 
When does a proponent have to respond to a provisoed denial? Again, I believe we should appeal 
to questions of epistemic presumption. Suppose there is such a presumption for ~P. Consider this 
exchange: 
 proponent  challenger 
! The accused is guilty of stealing the money. Ceteris paribus, the accused is not guilty, 
when the witnesses are lying and † the 
witnesses are lying 
 
Suppose all parties to this disputation know that the witnesses testified under oath. There is thus 
a presumption that they are not lying. Unless the challenger can show that they are, her provisoed 
denial is dialectically and epistemically ineffective. Why would the proponent have an obligation 
to meet it? 
 On the other hand, suppose there is no presumption for ~P. This does not mean that there 
is a presumption for P, but P at least is a realistic (and not merely an abstractly logical) 
possibility. It would seem that in this circumstance, the proponent needs to reply. This need 
would be more acute, should there be a presumption for P. Notice that the proviso in this denial 
might be an alternative to the claim C. For example, if C asserted that an antecedent 
circumstance instancing some relevant variable caused a phenomenon, P might assert that an 
antecedent instance of some other relevant variable was the cause. 
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 proponent  challenger 
! The plane crash was caused by a bomb 
exploding on board. 
Ceteris paribus, the plane crash was not 
caused by a bomb exploding on board, when 
it was caused by wind sheer and † the crash 
was caused by wind sheer. 
 
Should the instance of the alternative causal variable be a realistic possibility, should there not be 
a presumption that it does not hold, then the burden would be on the proponent to respond to this 
provisoed denial. This indicates that structurally, alternative positions are a special kind of 
objection. Hence we may discuss the discrimination problem just with respect to objections. 
 Let us assume that the challenger's objection legitimately shows the burden of proof to be 
on the proponent. If to the proponent's categorical assertion !C, the challenger has responded with 
a cautious denial †~C, the proponent is required to respond with a provisoed counterassertion 
 C/P & !P. 
The challenger in turn may question either conjunct of this response. A challenge to the 
categorical assertion !P will be either a cautious or a provisoed denial, just as with the 
categorically asserted initial claim C. A provisoed denial will moot an objection and the issue of 
whether the proponent needs to meet it is determined by the same questions of presumption and 
burden of proof which we considered with provisoed denials to the initial claim C. 
 A challenge to the ceteris paribus clause C/P will take the form of a weak distinction: 
 ~C/(P&Q) & †(P & Q). 
(Compare Rescher 1977, 12.) The challenger in effect is saying 
 
 All things being equal, C when P. But for all you have shown all things are not equal, P 
holds together with Q, and ceteris paribus ~C when P & Q. 
 All things being equal, if the witness testifies that she saw the accused enter the house, 
then the accused entered the house. But  
 All things being equal, if the witness testified that she saw the accused enter the house 
but, not wearing her glasses at the time of observation, she misobserved, then the accused 
did not enter the house. For all you have shown, although the witness testified that she 
saw the accused enter the house, she was not wearing her glasses at that time. 
 
Here the qualification Q is an objection and a response from the proponent would take us to the 
dialectical tier. Again, whether a response is needed depends on whether there is a presumption 
for ~Q. If there is, then there is no sufficient reason to think that Q is either true or a realistic 
possibility. Ordinarily, people wear their glasses or will testify under oath only to what they saw 
when capable of making a reliable observation, e.g. when wearing their glasses. The proponent 
need not respond. On the other hand, if there is no presumption for ~Q, if Q is a realistic 
possibility or if there is actually a presumption that Q holds, then the proponent needs to respond 
if his assertion that P is to count as a rationally persuasive reason for C. 
 This last remark highlights that the ceteris paribus clause enumerates the principle of the 
inference from P to C. To use Toulmin's terminology, it expresses the warrant of that move in 
propositional form. The distinction Q then presents a rebuttal. An objection in the form of a weak 
distinction to the ceteris paribus clause C/P then in effect is an objection to the argument from 
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C/P & !P to !C. Given our simplifying assumption that proponent and challenger are correct in 
their recognition of ceteris paribus inferences, objections to inferences will be rebuttals. The 
question of whether or not a proponent needs to respond to an objection to an inferential move in 
an argument is the same as the question of whether or not the proponent needs to respond to a 
weak distinction. 
 If the challenger responds to the proponent's categorical assertion !C with a provisoed 
denial, 
 ~C/P & †P, 
we have already discussed when the proponent has a dialectical obligation to respond to the 
objection †P. Given that obligation, the proponent may respond by addressing either conjunct. He 
may respond to †P with a categorical counterassertion 
 !~P 
or with a provisoed counterassertion 
 ~P/Q & !Q. 
(See Rescher 1977, 10.) He may respond to ~C/P with a strong distinction 
 C/(P & Q) & !(P & Q). 
(See Rescher 1977, 15.) It is open to the challenger in turn to question whichever of these 
responses the proponent makes. Questioning the categorical or provisoed counterassertion 
introduces no new considerations. Challenging a strong distinction may involve questioning the 
categorical assertion either through a cautions denial, 
 †~(P & Q), 
a provisoed denial 
 ~(P & Q)/R & †R, 
or questioning the ceteris paribus clause through a weak distinction 
 ~C/(P & Q & R) & †(P & Q & R). 
(See Rescher 1977, 15.) Here again, R counts as a further objection, but the question of whether 
it engenders a dialectical response clearly involves the questions of presumption and burden of 
proof which we have already discussed. 
 How may a proponent reply to a weak distinction, something in general of the form 
 ~X/(Y & Z) & †(Y & Z), 
where X/Y is an accepted ceteris paribus principle? As with a challenger's reply to a strong 
distinction, there are three possibilities——a categorical counterassertion to †(Y & Z), 
 !~(Y & Z), 
a provisoed counterassertion, 
 ~(Y & Z)/W & !W,  
or a strong distinction, 
 X/(Y & Z & W) & !(Y & Z & W) 
(See Rescher 1977, 15.) 
 Given that these are the moves in a formal disputation, we have indicated for those cases 
where the challenger introduces an objection, just when there is a burden on the proponent to 
meet that objection. The discrimination problem for objections raised within the context of a 
formal disputation——at least where ceteris paribus considerations are not directly questioned 
but challenged only through distinctions——thus reduces to the question of determining whether 
there is a presumption that a given objection does not hold or with whether the burden of proof is 
on the proponent to give reasons why it does not hold. We can meet the discrimination problem 
through an account of presumption and burden of proof. That indeed is not a trivial undertaking,4 
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which we cannot present here. It is sufficient if our argument has connected the two issues. 
 By investigating the discrimination problem through the objections which may be 
introduced in formal dialectic, we also address the infinite regress problem. At each stage, there 
are a small number of moves open to proponent or challenger——whosever turn it is to 
contribute at that stage——and each of these moves can be completed in a finite number of steps. 
Although continuation of the disputation is always in principle possible, there is nothing 
requiring that to complete a given stage one must have completed an infinite number of stages. 
Govier's insights behind the Benign Interpretation prove correct. 
 Clearly, much further work remains, for our discussion has left many open questions. In 
what way may formal disputation serve as a general template into which we can cast the 
argumentative process of which arguments are the products? In particular, can we accommodate 
within formal dialectic all the sorts of objections Johnson and Govier envisage? We have already 
seen how alternative positions can be included within the class of objections expressible by 
provisoed denials to the proponent's initial claim or conclusion. What may we say to objections 
to the reasoning——in the first instance to the illative core of the argument the proponent is 
presenting to defend his initial claim? These could be objections either to one or more of the 
premises the proponent brings forward or to the inferential moves from the premises to the 
conclusion. Concerning objections to premises, Johnson observes that "some...will be housed in 
alternative positions, though not all need be" (Johnson 1996, 265). But should an objection to a 
premise be housed in an alternative position, it would seem that such an objection would be 
expressible in formal dialectic as a provisoed denial of that premise 
 ~Pi/O & †O 
It would seem that this form would be appropriate given any consideration O constituting a 
ceteris paribus reason for ~Pi and not merely just for positions alternative to Pi. Where the 
challenger introduces no such consideration O, then it would seem that the challenger is simply 
questioning Pi, in effect indicating there is no presumption for Pi. If so, the proponent now has a 
burden of proof to defend it. 
 Suppose the challenger would want to object to Pi by claiming that Pi is outright false—
—it being generally recognized that Pi is outright false? Although the challenger cannot make a 
categorical assertion 
 !~Pi, 
she may still issue a challenge 
 †~Pi. 
We can look at this as a limiting case from the challenger's point of view of indicating that the 
burden of proof is on the proponent to defend Pi. Not only is the burden of proof on the 
proponent to support Pi, it is a burden he cannot discharge. 
 It might seem that many times an objection to an illative move from one or more 
premises to a conclusion would take the form of granting that all things being equal, given the 
premises we may expect the conclusion holds, but all things may not be equal in this case, due to 
some defeater. But such an objection presents a weak distinction 
 ~C/(P1 & ... & Pk & R) & †(P1 & ... & Pk & R) 
Again although the challenger may not categorically assert that R, should accepting that R in 
general be recognized as justified, her weak distinction will raise a burden of proof which the 
proponent may find hard, if not impossible, to discharge. 
 That statements cautiously asserted or cautiously denied may be matters of common 
recognition by those familiar with the issue brings us to Johnson's notion of the Standard 
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Objections, objections to the position being argued which are generally recognized by those 
conversant with the issue. If the objection presents a prima facie reason to reject the conclusion 
or a premise, structurally they are provisoed denials. If it presents a rebuttal to a ceteris paribus 
illative move, structurally it is a weak distinction. Now the picture of a formal disputation is of a 
proponent and challenger carrying out their regulated procedure before an adjudicator or 
determiner. In deciding who "won" a formal disputation, the determiner will apply both formal 
(e.g. any reasoning or questioning in a circle?) and material criteria——did the challenger drive 
the proponent into implausible commitments? (Rescher 1977, 23) As Rescher points out, the 
proponent's goal in a formal disputation is to give plausible reasons for propositions he 
categorically asserts, in particular if they are challenged. By contrast, the challenger seeks to 
drive the proponent to make implausible categorical assertions. "The proponent is ever striving to 
lead his case towards the secure ground of plausible contentions and the opponent is ever seeking 
to prevent his reaching any such safe harbor" (Rescher 1977, 24). 
 Surely, one would expect that should an objection to a position become standard, finding 
plausible replies would not be trivial. Hence a challenger who failed to raise these objections 
would be distinctly deficient in her contribution to a formal disputation. Now if a logically good 
argument may be regarded as modelled on the product of a good formal disputation as Rescher 
suggests——"In a well-conducted disputation, one will always be able to extract by analysis of 
the exchanges of the pro-con tabulation a good...argument——a unilateral line of reasoning in 
support of a thesis" (Rescher 1977, 23-24)——then good arguments will reflect that they are 
products of formal disputations where the challenger has raised the Standard Objections. 
 Besides objections to the illative core challenging either a premise or an illative move, 
Johnson indicates that there may be challenges to an unstated premise, to an implication or 
consequence, or to a proposition as being unclearly formulated (Johnson 2000a, 328). Clearly, a 
challenge to an unstated premise could be accommodated within formal dialectic should there be 
a move open to the challenger to ask the proponent whether he were committed to that premise. 
His affirmative answer is tantamount to his categorically asserting the premise. Rescher indicates 
that a challenger may question not just the proponent's categorical assertions but any logical, 
deductive consequences of any non-empty subset of those assertions. Thus formal disputation 
accommodates challenges to the logical implications of categorically asserted claims. 
 We may view problems of meaning as preliminary to argument evaluation. (Questions of 
acceptability, relevance, and ground adequacy all presuppose that we understand the propositions 
asserted.) If a proposition within an argument is unclear, we really do not know what argument is 
before us. Formal disputation may be thought of as a procedure making the simplifying 
assumption that the contributions of the proponent will always be clearly formulated. As such it 
would not handle objections of the last sort Johnson mentions. On the other hand, we can think 
of no prima facie reason against expanding the rules of formal dialectic to permit a challenger to 
ask a proponent what he means. 
 
 
 proponent  challenger 
  !X   What X  (What do you mean by X?) 
  !X′  
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Alternatively, the challenger might spell out two (or more) disambiguations of X: 
 
 proponent  challenger 
  !X 
  !X1
  Which (X1 ∨ X2) 
 
We must leave as an open question the extent to which such moves may be incorporated into 
formal dialectic. Hence, there seems to be in principle no problem in formal dialectic handling 
these additional types of objections Johnson envisages. 
 May formal disputation also accommodate the types of objections Govier classifies? In 
(1999) she tentatively proposes distinguishing objections raised against the conclusion, the 
argument in support of that conclusion, the arguer, the situation (qualifications, personal 
characteristics, and circumstances) of the arguer, and the way the argument and its conclusion are 
expressed (Govier 1999, 231). Clearly, our discussion has shown in what ways formal 
disputation may handle objections of the first two types. Govier speculates that an arguer may 
have a dialectical obligation to respond just to strong objections of just these two types. Can 
formal disputation express objections of the remaining three types? It is not clear how to answer 
this question for it is not clear what these types of objection amount to,5 and Govier does not 
illustrate them. Objections against the arguer or his or her situation sound like ad hominem 
objections, which have standardly been regarded as fallacious. Recent work in informal logic by 
Govier and Walton has argued that instances of patterns of reasoning standardly thought 
uniformly fallacious need not be. Whether any such instances of ad hominem patterns would 
constitute further types of objections and whether formal dialectic could accommodate them raise 
issues which we cannot pursue further here. 
 If an objection against the way an argument is expressed raises questions of meaning, we 
have already indicated how formal dialectic might be expanded to handle such an objection. If 
the objection does not concern meaning, it is again unclear what Govier means at this point. Are 
such objections the same as what Johnson calls criticisms? If so, what obligations the proponent 
has to reply to them have not been worked out. In light of these considerations, we claim that the 
burden would be on the objector to show that Govier has identified objections which formal 
disputation must accommodate. 
 Besides determining the extent to which formal dialectic needs to accommodate the types 
of objections Johnson and Govier envision, even more general questions arise. What 
complications would allowing direct challenges to ceteris paribus conditions introduce? How 
may we allow the challenger to accept the burden of proof to establish a presumption for some 
objection O, especially when there is a presumption for ~O? How then may the proponent be 
required to respond? May we continue to use this template if we broaden our possibilities for the 
illative moves beyond those involving ceteris paribus warrants? Indeed, what would it mean to 
have a comprehensive account of illative moves? We must leave all of these questions open. We 
have attempted to show how we may identify objections which require answers and how these 
answers do not require completing an infinite regress. Our discussion in this paper suffices then 
if we have shown how there may be progress without regress on the dialectical tier. 
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Notes 
  
1. See Blair and Johnson (1987, 45-48), Johnson (1992, 155-56), (1996, 103-12, 262-65), (2000a, 
159-75). 
2. This assumes, of course, that the argument is not circular. But we set aside such a possibility 
since we regard such arguments as clearly fallacious. 
3. Indeed, developing these conditions in our view requires an entire monograph in its own right. 
We have presented our answer in (200x). 
4. Working out when there is a presumption for a basic premise is the central issue of our (200x). 
5. Johnson makes this point about the third and fourth types of objections. See (2000b, 9). 
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